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The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 redefined the role of
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman). The Chairman now assumes many
additional roles and responsibilities including the development of the Department of
Defense (DoD) budget submission to the President. Two critical elements of this
development are the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's
Program Recommendation (CPR).
This thesis analyzes the CPA and CPR development process. The modern
military of today must engage in a complex game of mixing requirements, capabilities,
mission identification, threat, and politics to field the world's premier military force. The
introduction of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process improved
the process of service requirements analysis. The Chairman combines these assessments
and recommendations into the CPA and CPR.
Extensive research was conducted into the historical role of the Chairman relating
to the requirements generation and resource allocation processes within the DoD.
Numerous interviews of current Joint Staff and Navy Staff personnel familiar with the
CPA and CPR were also conducted.
Findings show the CPA and CPR are closely held documents considered personal
correspondence between the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. This situation
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This thesis analyses the processes associated with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Chairman) Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program
Recommendation (CPR) within the resource allocation process of the Department of
Defense (DoD). CDR Gabriel R. Salazar, USN published his thesis in June 1996 entitled
An Analysis Of The Role Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff In The Requirements Generation
And Resource Allocation Process Within The Department Of Defense. At that time, the
issues surrounding the CPA and CPR were new and not completely evaluated. CDR
Salazar recommended investigating the effects of the CPA and CPR on the resource
allocation process within the DoD. Prior to such an investigation, a thorough
understanding of the development of the CPA and CPR is necessary.
This thesis summarizes the historical methodology relating to the resource
allocation process of the DoD focusing on the role of the Chairman in that process. The
intricacies of the formulation of the CPA and CPR are also addressed.
B. BACKGROUND
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 redefined the role of
the Chairman. The Chairman now assumes many additional roles and responsibilities,
principally as the primary military advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA).
The Chairman also assumes a major role in the development of the DoD budget
submission to the President. Two critical elements of this development are the CPA and
the CPR.
The role of the services with respect to the resource allocation process is well
documented. The modern military of today must engage in a complex game of mixing
requirements, capabilities, mission identification, threat, and politics to field the world's
premier military force. This force must be able to respond to threats to the national
interests of the U.S. as deemed necessary by the NCA. As a result of the Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the emergence of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) and the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB) has
seen an increased scrutiny in the distribution of resources to the services. The
introduction of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process improved
the methodology and recommendations into the CPA and CPR.
Not only do the CPA and CPR help form the foundation for the DoD budget
submission but they also form the basis for resource allocation. The effects of resource
allocation on the individual Services and Agencies cannot be overlooked.
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this thesis included a detailed analysis of
books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, applicable directives and publications,
current Title 10 U.S. Code, position papers, policy papers, Flag briefings, and other
pertinent information resources. The majority of current information pertaining to the
requirements generation process, resource allocation process, and the CPA and CPR was
primarily gained from numerous interviews of Joint Staff and Navy Staff personnel
relating to the impacts of the CPA and CPR on the above mentioned processes.
D. SCOPE LIMITATIONS
The scope includes an analysis of the role of the Chairman in the requirements
generation and resource allocation processes. This thesis focuses on the formulation of
the CPA and CPR on these processes. This thesis does not address the development of
individual service programs or budgets.
E. THESIS OUTLINE
This study provides background information on the requirements generation and
resource allocation processes with respect to the Chairman. An analysis of the current
process was conducted. That analysis is followed by a description of the formulation of
the CPA and CPR followed by conclusions and recommendations.
The next chapter provides some background information on the requirements
generation and resource allocation processes. Special emphasis is placed on the role of
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in this process.

II. BACKGROUND ON REQUIREMENTS GENERATION AND
RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITH RESPECT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
It comes as no surprise that the current budget environment for the Department of
Defense (DoD) gives rise to such phrases as "hollow force" and "doing more with less."
DoD resources are scarce and are becoming increasingly scarce as time goes on. The
demise of the former Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold War and the beginning of
a systematic downsizing of the DoD. Fortunately, the DoD has been able to adjust to the
current budget environment. As CDR Gabriel Salazar, USN correctly stated in his thesis
An Analysis Of The Role Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff In The Requirements Generation
And Resource Allocation Process Within The Department Of Defense, June 1996:
The Department of Defense has adapted its resource allocation process to
this post Cold War era through a refinement of the Planning,
Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) first introduced over three
decades ago. With these austere DoD budgets, what was once a "free for
all" competition between the individual services for defense dollars, with
each service intent on maximizing its spending authority and weapons
system acquisitions, is now becoming a focused, single voice of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with regards to procurement decisions. [Ref. 1, p. 6]
Title 10, U.S. Code, directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman)
to advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force
capabilities identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans (section
153(a)(3)(c)). The statute further requires the Chairman to establish, after consultation
with the combatant commands, a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each
combatant command to carry out assigned missions (section 153(a)(3)(d)), and a uniform
system for reporting readiness of the combat support agencies to perform with respect to
war or threat to national security (section 193(c)). [Ref. 2. p. VII- 1] This chapter will
provide relevant background information relating to the role of the Chairman in the
requirements generation and resource allocation processes.
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The end of World War II brought about numerous changes within the DoD. The
United States was now a major player in worldwide security. In a message to the
Congress on December 19, 1945, President Truman stated:
Whether we like it or not, we must all recognize that the victory which we
have won has placed upon the American people the continuing burden or
responsibility for world leadership. The future peace of the world will
depend in large part upon whether or not the United States shows that it is
really determined to continue in its role as a leader among nations. It will
depend upon whether or not the United States is willing to maintain the
physical strength necessary to act as a safeguard against any future
aggressor. Together with the other United Nations, we must be willing to
make sacrifices necessary to protect the world from future aggressive
warfare. In short, we must be prepared to maintain in constant and
immediate readiness sufficient military strength to convince any future
potential aggressor that this nation, in its determination for a lasting peace,
means business. [Ref. 3, p. 9]
The innovations in warfare achieved by all branches of the armed forces in World War II
allowed the birth of modern warfare and modern weapons systems. Although the world
had changed, the Constitution of the United States did not. Services continued to receive
funding based upon individual requirements without regard for commonality and
redundancy.
Again, President Truman noted:
Instances of duplication among Army and Navy activities and facilities
have been brought to the attention of the Congress on many occasions.
The degree of unity that was accomplished during the war in strategic
planning and in theater command is in striking contrast with the
separatism that prevailed in the whole range of supply and service
functions. It will never be possible to achieve absolute coordination of the
supply and service functions of all services. Neither the War Department
nor the Navy Department has been able to eliminate all duplication even
within its own organization. But these is no question that the extent of
waste through lack of coordination between the two Departments is very
much greater than the waste resulting from faulty coordination within
each. If we can attain as much coordination among all the services as now
exists within each department, we shall realize extensive savings. [Ref. 3,
pp. 11-12]
The President was not happy with the current status of the military primarily because the
Services by and large did not work well together as a cohesive force. During the Korean
War era, it was evident that combined arms, i.e. the simultaneous use of land, sea, and air
assets, were the way of the future. [Ref. 3, p. 10] Ultimately, there was a call for total
service unification.
The National Security Act of 1947 was the first attempt to get a handle on the
post-World War II military and to form a force that would meet the current and future
national security requirements of the United States. The purpose of the Act was to
establish a structure to formulate national security policy for the United States
Government. [Ref. 3. Preface, p. 4] The Services continued to submit their budget
requests directly to Congress with minimal guidance or coordination from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). By and large the
Services stayed within their stated roles and missions. Minimal, if any. coordination to
address acquisition redundancy was conducted. [Ref. 4, p. 17]
It quickly became apparent that this structure, based upon the National Security
Act of 1947, was not the way to go. Fifteen months after the National Security Act of
1947 was signed into law, then Secretary of Defense James Forrestal noted that there was
still much work to be done.
As already indicated, the act has been in effect only a little more than a
year, and this first period of operation under a statute as far-reaching as the
National Security Act cannot be regarded as typical of the years that are to
follow. Nevertheless, based on the heavy workload of problems which
have required attention and which will be described in greater detail later
in this report, and based also on our general experience to date, it is my
feeling that the statutory changes suggested herewith deserve serious
consideration. [Ref. 3, p. 64]
Secretary Forrestal concluded his report by calling for the creation of a position to lead
the Joint Chiefs and provide a focus for the civilian control of the military.
In short, the Act fails to provide for a fully responsible official with
authority adequate to meet his responsibility, whom the President and the
Congress can hold accountable. The Act fails to provide the basis for an
organization and a staff adequate to achieve the most efficient and
economical defense program and to attain effective and informed civilian
control. [Ref. 3, p. 79]
As a result of Secretary Forrestal' s comments, the Act was amended in 1949. A key
element of this amendment was the designation of the Chairman. Secretary Forrestal 's
recommendations regarding the Chairman included:
The provisions of the act which deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff should
be changed in the following respects; (a) The provision of the act which
names the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff should be deleted, (b) Provision should be made for
the designation of a responsible head for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (In my
opinion, this official should either be designated from among the three
remaining members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or, in the alternative,
should be designated as a fourth person. In either event, he should be the
person to whom the President and the Secretary of Defense look to see to
it that matters with which the Joint Chiefs should deal are handled in a
way that will provide the best military staff assistance to the President and
the Secretary of Defense.) [Ref. 3, pp. 64-65]. . .Finally. I recommend
that the Congress provide for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to take
precedence over all other military personnel, and to be the principal
military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and to
perform such other duties as they may prescribe. [Ref. 3. p. 80]
Section 211 of the amended act designated the Chairman as the representative of the
corporate Joint Chiefs and outlined his duties and responsibilities. [Ref. 3. pp. 94-95]
The seeds were sown to migrate towards an increasingly joint posture within the DoD.
Ultimately, the National Security Act of 1947 (amended) led to the Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986.
B. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986
The period of time between the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed an ever-
increasing cry to once again reform the DoD. Numerous studies' were conducted to
determine the problems and solutions relating to the DoD. These studies highlighted two
major problem areas. First, the corporate JCS cold not provide useful and timely military
advice. Second, unified Command-in-Chiefs (CINCs) lacked the necessary authority and
influence to effectively carry out their missions. [Ref. 5, p. 10] These studies convinced
1 Some recent studies are the 1982 JCS Chairman's Special Study Group report, The Organization and
Functions of the JCS ; the 1983 book by Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense Organization ; the 1985
Center for Strategic and International Studies report, Toward a More Effective Defense ; the 1985 Senate
Committee on Armed Services study. Defense Organization: The Need for Change ; the 1985 House
Committee on Armed Services report, JCS Reorganization Act of 1985 ; the 1986 House Committee on
Armed Services report. Bill Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 ; and the 1986 President's Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management report. A Quest for Excellence [Ref. 5. p. 10, Footnote 2)
the Congress that reform was required. Douglas C. Lovelace noted in his book,
UNIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES: Implementing The 1986
Department of Defense Reorganization Act: "The scope of the legislation clearly
evidenced congressional dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of
the U.S. armed forces. Congress believed the problems derived from dysfunctional
relationships among the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the CJCS, the
CINCs, and the Service components, and the Service Chiefs." [Ref. 6, p. 15]
Recommendations typically mirrored service "party lines" without regard to the best
combination of assets to employ. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Service
Committee, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger concluded:
The existing structure [of the JCS], if it does not preclude the best
military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier
to such advice... [T] he recommendations... must pass through a screen
designed to protect the institutional interest of each... service... [N]o
service ox may be gored. .
.
The unavoidable outcome is... log-rolling, back-scratching,
marriage agreements, and the like...The proffered advice is generally
irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. [Ref. 6, p.
21]
Military operations in the 1980s such as EAGLE CLAW (the abortive Iranian hostage
rescue attempt) and URGENT FURY (the invasion of Grenada) reinforced the views of
such reform minded critics, especially within the Congress. Consequently, the efforts of
these critics, and associated analysis of the DoD, resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This Act is the first serious change in the DoD
since the National Security Act of 1947. [Ref. 1, p. 13]
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The Goldwater-Nichols Act drastically altered the formulation of U.S. defense
policy. The role of the corporate JCS and its respective responsibilities in the resource
allocation process also changed. These changes include:
• Designation of the Chairman, vice the corporate JCS, as the principal military
advisor to the President, the National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of
Defense.
• Assumption by the Chairman of additional responsibilities in assisting the
President and the Secretary of Defense in developing the strategic vision of
the armed forces, strategic and conventional net assessments, contingency
plans, doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces, and advising the
Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs and budgets.
• Creation of the position of Vice-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).
The VCJCS primarily assists the Chairman and acts for the Chairman in his
absence. The Vice-Chairman is subordinate only to the Chairman and
participates in all JCS meetings but only votes when acting for the Chairman.
• Removal of the 400-officer limitation on the Joint Staff and placing it under
the direction of the Chairman vice the corporate JCS.
• Strengthening of the role of the unified commanders (unified CINCs) at the
expense of their component commanders (service CINCs). This resulted in
component commanders now having to support their service sponsors as well
as their unified commanders especially regarding resource allocation issues.
The Chairman was now designated as the spokesman for unified commanders
regarding the distribution of resources. [Ref. 7, p. 59, pp. 62-64]
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was bitterly opposed by ALL military services. Each
Service alleged they would lose their autonomy and their "one-on-one" relationship with
the Congress. The Services alleged this Act would result in unnecessary oversight of
virtually every aspect of their operations. This oversight was felt to be excessive and
stifling. Also, the role of the CJCS was seen as too powerful. [Ref. 6, p. 57] Changes in
officer education and career paths were also a major issue with this Act. The
requirements for Joint Professional Military Education and subsequent designation as a
1 1
Joint Specialist Officer were seen as detrimental to the proper career progression of a
typical warrior. [Ref. 6, pp. 54-56] Douglas Lovelace noted:
Two services have failed to meet the act's prescribed minimum joint tour
lengths for flag officers. Additionally, all of the services, on occasion,
have failed to meet the joint officer promotion requirements of the GNA
[Goldwater-Nichols Act]. There is evidence that the joint education and
assignment requirements of the GNA may, in fact, inhibit an officer's
potential for promotion to flag rank....Service parochialism has been
significantly mitigated but still exists. An admiral assigned to the Joint
Staff summed-up the current situation when he said, 'I may wear a purple
suit, but it is still double-breasted.' [Ref. 6, p. 60]
The Chairman was now a major player in the resource allocation and
requirements generation processes. Also, the influence of the JCS expanded into all
phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to effect better
decisions relating to resource allocations. The Chairman's role in PPBS is well
documented in CDR Salazar's thesis. As previously stated, this thesis will address the
Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation
(CPR) within the PPBS.
C. CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM ASSESSMENT AND THE
CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM RECOMMENDATION
The results of the Joint Warfare Capability Assessment (JWCA) analyses and
their review by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) are inputs to the
Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation
(CPR). Through the CPR, the Chairman provides recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense for inclusion in the annual Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG
provides programming guidance to the Services. Through the CPA, the Chairman
12
provides and assessment of Service programs to the Secretary of Defense. This
assessment helps ensure that Service programs adequately address joint warfighting
requirements. [Ref. 8, pp. 24-25]
1. Chairman's Program Assessment
The CPA was designed to meet the responsibility assigned the Chairman in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act to advise the Secretary of Defense on the prioritization of
requirements. It is the primary document that influences the Programming and
Budgeting phases of the PPBS within the DoD. [Ref. 9, p. 10] The CPA is developed
during the Program Review Cycle of the Programming phase and comprises an
assessment of Service Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). The CPA is a major
tool utilized to assist the Secretary of Defense in decisions relating to the DoD budget
submission. [Ref. 10, p. 49]
The CPA assists the Chairman in fulfilling his statutory duty to do the following:
• Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program
recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other
components of the DoD conform to the priorities established in strategic plans
and support the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant
commanders;
• Submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and
budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance furnished by
the Secretary, in order to achieve greater conformance with established
priorities; and
• Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs
and policies of the Armed Forces, in the area of manpower, conform to
strategic plans.
(a) The CPA assesses how well strategic guidance and the POMs
submitted by the military departments. United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), and defense agencies
conform to national military defense priorities and strategic
guidance. When appropriate, it may contain alternative
13
recommendations and proposals to improve conformance with
strategic guidance or the priorities established for the
requirements of the CINCs.
(b) CPA development is an iterative process that begins before the
POMs are published and ends when critical issues are identified
for inclusion in the CPA. Services, CINCs, defense agencies, and
the Joint Staff are involved throughout the process. This
coordination is essential to identify and properly develop specific
issues appropriate for the Chairman to formally bring before the
Secretary of Defense. Documents considered in CPA
development include, but are not limited to. POM preparation
instructions, OSD Fiscal Guidance, the DPG, the POMs
themselves, the National Military Strategy, the Joint Planning
Document, the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA), the
CINCs Integrated Priority Lists, the Combat Support Agency
Responsiveness and Readiness Report, the Chairman's
Preparedness Assessment Report, and the Logistics Sustamability
Analysis. [Ref 1 1 , pp. 5- 1 1 - 5- 1 3]
The CPA is where the Chairman assesses the Services' and Agencies' programs for
compliance with the CPR.
2. Chairman's Program Recommendation
The CPR was initially submitted in February 1995. In addition to the CPA, the
CPR has become the other significant output of the new JROC process. The CPR was
designed to inform the Secretary of Defense and the military Services what the
Chairman's desires are regarding the Services' POMs. [Ref. 9, p. 16] The CPR
establishes the Chairman's measures of effectiveness for assessing Service program
efficiency.
The Services receive the information in the CPR and are fully aware of the
Chairman's desires relating to their POMs. The CPR has become a critical document for
the services to consider as they prepare their programs. It is a strong indication of what
will appear in the CPA. The Services are also aware that issues in the CPR, not
14
adequately addressed in their POMs, have the potential of being raised as alternative
program recommendations in the Programming phase ol the PPBS. [Ref. ( >. pp. U)-17]
The CPR has evolved to become the primary document influencing the force
structure depicted in the DPG. The DPG provides the Secretary of Defense's planning
guidance and fiscal constraints for the military departments to use in their POM
development. It provides the link between the Planning and Programming phases of
PPBS. It is the result of a deliberate process that weighs desired military capabilities
against fiscal realities. Figure 2-1 illustrates the PPBS cycle and where the CPA and
CPR fit into that cycle.
JROC/PPBS CYCLE CALENDAR
Figure 2- 1 (Adapted fr°m ^e ^ 29, p 14]
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D. ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
As previously stated, the role of the Chairman was dramatically changed with the
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Prior to 1986, the Chairman was forced
to rely on individual service and DoD analysis as a basis for his force structure
recommendations. The Joint Staff, by law, did not work for the Chairman but rather for
the corporate JCS. Title II of the Goldwater-Nichols Act directed the Chairman to be
"responsible for advising on programs and budgets, reviewing combatant command
organization, developing joint doctrine, evaluating preparedness, and performing net
assessments." [Ref. 5, p. 2] Admiral William Owens, USN, the VCJCS, testified before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 28, 1996:
I think that the authors of Goldwater-Nichols had in mind that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should look not only at the new
systems that are being bought but the entire range of system and concepts
that make up our military capability and to provide recommendations in
budget and program form to the Secretary of Defense for his decision.
[Ref. 12, p. 5]
The Goldwater-Nichols Act directed the Chairman to advise the Secretary of
Defense on the following three critical areas relating to requirements generation and
resource allocation issues:
• To assess and comment on military requirements and affordability issues for
acquisition programs of the Services within the framework of the entire DoD
budget.
• To assess requirements prioritization among the Services and DoD agencies
and to reflect these priorities in his assessment of the individual Service's
budgets.
• To submit alternative program recommendations and budget proposals when
warranted. [Ref. 10, p. 21]
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The additional responsibility to review DoD budgets in order to assess their
conformance with established strategic plans and unified commanders' warfighting
requirements placed the Chairman at the center of resource allocation issues.
The Chairman is also charged with recommending specific capabilities and
acquisition of weapons systems across Service and Agency lines to effect a force
structure that can execute the President's National Security Strategy. Working with the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman has become the primary player in shaping the
nation's military force structure. [Ref. 6, pp. 40-52]
1. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
The primary process the Chairman utilizes to shape the structure of the United
States military is the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Developed
by the Rand Corporation in the 1950s, PPBS was first introduced to the DoD by
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1962. PPBS is a process that attempts to
improve decision-making regarding the allocation of resource among numerous
programs, initiatives, and alternatives in orders to accomplish specific national defense
objectives. PPBS attempts to tie national strategy goals to specific programs and
ultimately to an executable budget. [Ref. 4, pp. 1-26]
Lieutenant Thomas A. Simcik, USN, in his thesis Reengineering The Navy
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) Process, December 1996. expertly
summarized the PPBS process:
PPBS focuses on objectives and requirements, and what is necessary to
meet them. PPBS, in concept, is a simple process. Based on the
anticipated threat to national security objectives, a strategy is developed.
Requirements to execute the strategy are then estimated and programs
are developed consistent with the strategy. Finally, the costs of the
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approved programs are budgeted. [Ref. 6, p. C-2]" Figure (2) illustrated
PPBS in a linear format.
Figure (2) Basic PPBS Process [After Ref 6]
Although there have been many changes to the PPBS structure
over the years, the basic tenets of the system have remained: three
interrelated but separate phases; program and budget guidance to the
military services from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); and, the use of
quantitative analysis to choose among competing programs.
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
coordinates planning efforts for national security for both the civilian and
military parts of the organization. PPBS translates force requirements
developed by the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) into
programs which generate budgetary requirements which are then
presented to Congress as part of the President's budget.
The PPBS process operates year-round with each of three
components of the procedures (planning, programming, and budgeting)
working on various phases of the cycle. In reality, PPBS is not a linear
process but an iterative, overlapping mechanism of assessment, review
and decision all focused on one objective: to provide the operational
commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable
with fiscal constraints. [Ref. 13, pp. 7-8]
2. Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
The Joint Capability Assessments Process is a relatively new procedure by which
the Chairman influences the Planning phase of the PPBS. The JROC was established in
its present form in 1987, as the military oversight body that assesses potential military
requirements and determines which major weapons systems will enter the procurement
process. The JROC was the mechanism intended to improve the link between the PPBS
and the DoD acquisition process. Although the JROC was an excellent forum to address
2
Ref 6 is "U.S. Department of Defense, Practical Comptrollership Manual
. Monterey, CA., March 1996.
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procurement and acquisition issues, it was not until the JWCA process was introduced
that the role of the Chairman truly changed. The JWCA process was instituted in 1994 to
provide the analytical basis by which assessments on future joint warfare capabilities
were made. [Ref. 9, pp. 9-1 1]
The JWCA and the JROC processes provide the JCS with the analytical
foundation to assess future military capabilities and the forum to review these
assessments. These processes ultimately assist the Chairman in prioritizing requirements
that address desired capabilities.
The Chairman also participates in major budget issue meetings to resolve
significant resource allocation issues brought up by the Services in his capacity as Vice-
Chairman of the Defense Planning Resources Board. Since these issues are of such a
vital importance to the Services, they are typically resolved in consultation with the
Service Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense.
When the President's Budget is finally submitted to Congress, the Chairman
prepares a Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). This document provides an
assessment of the force structure supported by the President's Budget and its affect on the
national military strategy. It also services as a basis for the CPR for the following POM




In summary, the influence of the Chairman on the Planning phase of the PPBS
has increased significantly as a result of JWCA and JROC deliberations, resulting in the
development of the CPR. The CPR has become a dominant influence on the DPG, the
end product of the Planning phase of the PPBS. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 significantly changed the role of the Chairman in the
requirements generation and resource allocation processes within the DoD. The
analytical foundation for the CPA and CPR resides in the Joint Capability Assessment
Process within the JCS. The JWCA process provides the basis for which the JROC
makes resource allocation recommendations. The next chapter will address the
requirements generation and resource allocation process. In particular, the role of the
Joint Staff, sources of input, requirement evaluations, and process results will be
examined.
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III. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION SYSTEM PROCESS
Much has been written about the requirements generation process for the DoD.
Numerous texts and instructions, both directly and indirectly, address these processes.
Blunting The Sword, by Dennis S. Ippolito provides excellent background material
framing this process within the overall defense budget process and the respective politics
behind the processes. Modernization In Lean Times: Modifications And Upgrades, by
LTC Thomas R. Evans, USA, CDR Kathleen M. Lyman, USN, and LTCOL Michael S.
Ennis, USAF provides a focus on this process relating to modifying and upgrading major
weapons systems. The Defense Resource Allocation Process, by CDR William C. Keller,
USN is virtually required reading for all naval officers assigned to the Chief of Naval
Operations staff. Furthermore, numerous Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and Service
instructions refer to these processes. It is these instructions that are the most pertinent for
this thesis.
CDR Keller states, "The [Requirements Generation System] RGS is the process
the military uses to identify current and future mission needs to fill a capability
deficiency or exploit a technological opportunity." [Ref. 14, p. V-17] Regardless of the
Service or Defense Agency in question, maximum capability at the lowest possible cost is
the mantra for the DoD. This is becoming increasingly difficult considering that our
force structure and budgets have decreased approximately 33% since 1985 including a
65% reduction in procurement. The DoD must now find new ways to maximize each
dollar allocated to it. [Ref. 15, p. 1-1] The RGS seeks to accomplish this goal. Former
CJCS General John Shalikashvili, USA, commented in the Autumn/Winter 1994-1995
:i
edition of Joint Forces Quarterly (pages 4-8) "Today, those of us who serve in the
Armed Forces are caught up in the coincidence of three revolutions. . .the end of the Cold-
War... defense budgets are declining along with military resources... the military
technical revolution..." General Shalikashvili concludes that the loss of our primary
threat (the former Soviet Union) combined with decreasing budgets for the foreseeable
future and an ever increasing technological battlefield will require drastic changes in the
way DoD does business. [Ref. 15, p. 2-2] Consequently requirements generation takes
on an ever-increasing joint perspective and therefore must be subject to joint as well as
individual Service requirements. The RGS produces the necessary information for
decision-makers to evaluate Mission Needs Statements (MNSs) for Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAISs)
with missions requiring an interface to the warfighter. [Ref. 16, p. 4]
The RGS is a methodical process that starts with an idea identified as a possible
requirement. The VCJCS has the responsibility of oversight of the RGS and is assisted
by the JROC and the Joint Staff. [Ref. 14, p. V-17] Requirements are generated from a
variety of sources, however, most are derived from the Secretary of Defense, CJCS, a
CINC, a Service, or the JROC itself. Figure 3-1, discussed below, provides an excellent
flowchart of the RGS.
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Figure 3-1 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. V-18]
Once the need is identified, a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) is conducted by the DoD
component that identified the requirement. The MAA considers such topics as threat,
policy, available technology, the current budget environment, capability, defense
strategy, and doctrine. This analysis determines whether the need is derived from a
technological opportunity or a deficiency in current military posture. Once the need is
identified, a solution is determined that is either material, i.e. a new weapons system, or
non-material, i.e. changes in doctrine or tactics. [Ref. 16, p. 3] If the solution is material,
a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) is required. [Ref. 14, p. V-17]
The MNS is drafted by the component organization and is coordinated through all
CINCs, Services, and Defense Agencies affected by the MNS. Part of this coordination
is to determine the Acquisition Category (ACAT) of the requirement. A description of
ACAT classifications is provided in the Appendix. The evaluation of the NMS
determines if the MDAP fits ACAT I or less than ACAT I criteria. If the MNS is deemed
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to be less than an ACAT I program, the Service Secretary or delegated Acquisition
Executive validates the MNS. [Ref. 14, p. V-17] If the MNS is an ACAT I program, the
JROC will conduct a review of the MNS, validate it, and establish the joint potential of
the MNS. [Ref. 16, p. 3] As long as the MNS receives approval throughout the RGS, it
will ultimately be incorporated into the lead Service's POM.
A. JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
(JROQ/JOINT WARFARE CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT (JWCA)
Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 181, established and empowered the JROC as an









Figure 3-2 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 21]
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organization. For all intents and purposes the JROC is the pinnacle of the requirements
generation process. The JROC is comprised of four-star representation from each of the
Services. Although the CJCS officially chairs the Council, this duty has been delegated
to the VCJCS. [Ref. 18, p. 2] Figure 3-3 illustrates the composition of the JROC.
JROC MEMBERSHIP
• Cross-Service, Decisional Council
• Supports CJCS Title JO Responsibilities
• Validates Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP)
^requirements, performance parameters, and priorities






Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs Of Staff
Figure 3-3 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 4]
While functioning in its advisory position to the CJCS, the following initiatives were
enacted to formalize the role of the JROC:
• The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 directed the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to advise the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) on the priorities of military requirements.
• In 1994, General Shalikashvili directed expansion of the JROC charter to
more fully support statutory responsibilities. The JROC accordingly
established its Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (TWCA) process,
including increased involvement by CINCs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS).
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• The JROC's mission was codified in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act,
effective January 31, 1997.
• As the CENCs' spokesman, the Chairman approaches the assessment of
military needs from a joint warfighting perspective to ensure interoperability
and identify opportunities for joint or multi-Service applications.
• The JROC/JWCA process is the Chairman's primary vehicle for obtaining a
capabilities-based assessment of broad mission areas across Service lines.
[Ref. 18, p. 1]
In essence, the JROC functions as the lynchpin for the entire JWCA process. This body
is the central focal point and, as such, yields a great deal of influence with the Chairman.
They become the "honest brokers" for the Chairman by rigorously examining all aspects
of every proposal thereby aligning mission needs with operational requirements and
performance criteria. Perhaps the most important task of the JROC is to assure the
approved requirements not only meet the needs of the warfighters but also allow the
acquisition community enough "trade-space" (flexibility) to negotiate the best possible
contracts to fill the stated and approved requirements. Ultimately, the JROC must be the
focal point, or primary link, between the CINCs and Services and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. The role of the JROC is summarized in Figure 3-4.
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JROC ROLE
• Direct the Joint Warfighting Assessment Process
• Tie Acquisition/requirements process to the warfighter
• Challenge and validate key requirements
- Mission Needs Statements (MNS), Operational
Requirements Documents (ORD), Key Performance
Parameters (KPP)
• Requirements written in warfighter terms to allow trade-
space for acquisition community
• Be THE link with Services, CINCs and OSD
Figure 3-4 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 5]
The JROC Review Board (JRB) provides assistance to the JROC in the
requirements generation process. The JRB assists the JROC by:
1. Overseeing the requirements generation process by reviewing major defense
acquisition program requirements and performance parameters, thereby ensuring
programs are affordable and achievable.
2. Providing a focus for the JROC assessments by shaping and directing the JWCA
process through initial reviews of JWCA insights, findings and recommendations and
providing appropriate guidance, suggestions, and direction prior to the final JROC
review.
3. Nominating topics for JRB/JROC consideration and advising the' JROC Chairman on
issues requiring Council review.
4. Interfacing with the CINCs staffs on capability issues to ensure that the assessment
process incorporates the joint requirements of the various CINC areas of
responsibility (AORs). [Ref. 19, p. 6]
The JRB is chaired by the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment (J-8) and is comprised of two-star representation from each Service. Figure
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Again, much like the JROC, the JRB functions to provide the best possible systems to the
warfighting community. Although the JRB is far more parochial from a service
perspective than the JROC, it does perform a critical function in the JWCA process.
Without the JRB, the JROC would never be able to wade through the myriad of proposals
for joint systems and capabilities. Consequently, the JRB screens the proposals and only
those that prove to have exceptional merit are passed along to the JROC. The role of the
JRB is summarized in Figure 3-6. %
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JRB ROLE
• Shapes and directs JROC's Joint Warfighting
Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process
• Reviews major defense acquisition programs
requirements and performance parameters
• Ensure programs are affordable and achievable
• Interfaces with CINC staffs on capabilities
issues
Figure 3-6 [Adapted from Ref. 20. p. 7]
Part of the JROC charter is to "...review all (ACAT I, or potential ACAT I)
Mission Needs Statements (MNSs) and review major programs prior to acquisition
milestone decisions." [Ref. 15, p. 2-4] In order to perform their functions more
effectively, the JROC devised a process within the RGS that sought to:
• Decrease service rivalries.
• Eliminate duplication of effort and/or redundant systems.
• Achieve the best requirements to meet current and future threats. [Ref. 15, p.
2-5]
This process is known as the Joint Warfare Capability Assessment (JWCA) process.
The JWCA process is governed by CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01. It assists
the CJCS in his statutory duty under Title 10 U.S. Code to provide the Secretary of
Defense assessments of the DoD. [Ref. 19, pp. 1-2] By definition, the JWCAs "...are
continuous assessments conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts
from the Joint Staff, unified commands. Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Defense Agencies, and others as required." [Ref. 19, p. 4] The role of the JWCA is





• Assess joint military capability areas
• Identify opportunities to improve warfighting
effectiveness
• Analyze critical deficiencies and strengths in joint
warfighting capabilities
• Provide insight into issues of requirements,
readiness and support
Figure 3-7 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 9]
Although all of the points illustrated in Figure 3-7 are important, perhaps the most critical
aspect of the JWCA is the ability to thoroughly analyze a program or project from a wide
variety of disciplines, thereby allowing an honest evaluation. All of the Services and
Agencies participate in the JWCA as well as each JWCA team sponsored by a Joint Staff
Directorate. In one way, shape, or form, the JWCA can provide the necessary analysis to
make an informed decision for the right reasons.
A Director in the Joint Staff sponsors each JWCA team. JWCA teams perform
various functions for the JROC that include:
• Identifying deficiencies and strengths in joint capabilities.
• Providing the JROC with assessment results and recommendations to satisfy
warfighting requirements and operational efficiencies.
• Establishing JWCA teams to conduct assessments. [Ref. 18, pp. 2-3]
Ultimately these assessments provide the critical cornerstone for the development of both
the CPA and the CPR. Without these assessments, the Chairman would have an
extremely difficult time justifying his assessment and recommendations in the CPA and
CPR.
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There are twelve JWCA domains as depicted in Figure 3-8. (This figure is known
throughout the Joint Staff as the "galactic radiator.") [Ref. 20, p. 8] Although complex
in appearance, this matrix demonstrates the interactivity of the JWCA process. For
JWCA MEMBERSHIP
Joint DOD
Participants staff Services OSD CINCs Agencies others
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Figure 3-8 [Adapted from Ref. 20. p. 8]
example, the Director for Command, Control, Communications, & Computer Systems
(J6) sponsors the Command and Control JWCA team. Specific members of the Joint
Staff, the Services, OSD, the CINCs, DoD Agencies, and other necessary parties form
this JWCA. Unless the CINC has a specific interest in the JWCA issue, a common block
approach is usually utilized. In other words, the interested CINC will vote for the other
CINCs or function as the coordinator amongst all CINCs and voice all opinions for the
remaining CINCs. If no CINC has a direct interest with the JWCA. the Joint Staff
functions as the CINC liaison for that JWCA. All issues relating to Command and
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Control are analyzed by this JWCA. Consequently, any issues relating to Command and
Control that are raised to the JROC are referred to this JWCA for analysis. Figure 3-9
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Figure 3-9 [Adapted from Ref. 1 1, p. 2-18]
The JWCA process is an annual cycle of events that helps frame the Chairman's
Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).
Figure 3-10 summarizes this the JWCA assessment cycle. [Ref. 24, p. 56]
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Figure 3-10 [Adapted from Ref. 24, p. 56]
Pages B-2 through B-6 of Reference 19 provide an excellent synopsis of the
JWCA process. The process commences after the issuance of the DPG in the September
timeframe. This commencement is marked by briefings on issues relating to deficiencies
in joint military capabilities. These briefings are known as contract briefs. Issues are
derived from various sources including:
• CJCS
> National Military Strategy (NMS)





> Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)
• Military Departments (e.g. Navy) [Ref 19, p. B-2]
33
Contract briefs are then addressed by one of the twelve JWCA teams as illustrated in
Figure 3-9. The JWCA teams evaluate the contract brief focusing on the relationships
and interactions with respect to joint warfighting. [Ref. 19, p. 2] Upon completion of
their evaluation, the JWCA team will brief their findings and recommendations initially
to the JRB, during the first In-Process Review (JPR), then to the full JROC for approval.
(See Figure 3-11) [Ref. 19, p. B-2]
DetailedJWCA Cycle
Figure 3-11 [Adapted from Ref. 19, p. B-21]
After the JROC has approved the contract brief for consideration, the JRB
conducts a trip to each CENC. The purpose of this trip is to brief the CLNC's staff on the
status of various JWCA issues and to obtain their inputs to these issues. [Ref. 19, p. B-3]
Although the JRB is a joint body. Service sentiments on these issues are a bit more
parochial at this level and are therefore the subjects of extensive debate. To more
effectively pursue a common position on the JWCA issue, upon return from this trip, the
JRB divorces itself from the confines of the Pentagon and conducts an offsite conference
to discuss which JWCA topics will be presented to the JROC and makes its
recommendations for inclusion into the CPR. [Ref. 19, p. B-3]
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Upon receipt of the JRB recommendations, the JROC conducts an offsite
conference to review these recommendations and resolve any contentious issues from the
JRB. The JROC then visits the CENCs and briefs them on the status of critical JWCA
issues and obtains their final input to the CPR. [Ref. 19, p. B-3] The major difference
between these conferences and visits is that the JRB is a two-star and below body while
the JROC is a four-star body. The CPR is produced as a result of these visits and briefs.
As depicted below in Figure 3-12, the CPR serves as a major input into the Secretary of
Defense's DPG. [Ref. 19, p. B-3]
Detailed JWCA Cycle
Figure 3-12 [Adapted from Ref. 19, p. B-3]
Production of the CPR marks the halfway point of the JWCA cycle. Because of
the dynamic nature of the strategic environment of the DoD, a Midterm JWCA Contract
Brief allows the CINCs, Services, and Agencies to submit new issues to the JWCA
process. Normally, these issues are critical in nature and cannot wait until the start of the
next JWCA cycle. [Ref. 19, p. B-4]
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A second set of JWCA assessments is performed on the original contract brief
issues. The JRB conducts another IPR to evaluate these assessments and considers the
new contract briefs submitted midterm. About this time, the Services have completed








-. _ ,_ [Adapted from Ref. 19, p. B-4]
Figure 3-13 K
JWCA teams now compare the Services POMs with the CINCs requirements and the
submitted CPR. This comparison serves as an input to the CPA, which in turn is a major
input to the Secretary of Defense's Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). (See Figure
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Figure 3-14 [Adapted from Ref. 19, p. B-4]
After completion of the second IPR, the JRB conducts a second trip to visit the
CINCs staffs to:
• Provide feedback and status of JWCA topics going to the JROC.
• Update the status of midterm JWCA topics.
• Obtain input. [Ref. 19, p. B-5]
A second JRB offsite conference is held prior to the Chairman's submission of the CPA
to the SECDEF to:
• Review the status of completed JWCA topics.
• Review the assessment of Service POMs.
• Provide additional guidance to JWCA teams for midterm issues.
• Identify critical issues to be presented to the JROC at their offsite conference.
[Ref. 19, p. B-5]
The second JROC offsite conference provides decisions on relevant JWCA issues and
decides which issues will be presented during the next JROC trip to the CINCs. These
issues are then presented to the CINCs. The CINCs then provide their comments and
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concerns regarding these issues to the JROC. Upon completion of the visit to the CINCs,
the JROC provides its input to the CPA. The CPA is then finalized and submitted to the
SECDEF as input to the PDM. [Ref. 19, p. B-5]
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Although the primary threat to the national interests of the United States is, for the
most part, eliminated, the necessity for providing our armed forces with the best
equipment possible is still a national priority. Without an effective requirements
generation process, the ability to maintain our capability as the world's premier military
force is greatly diminished. An integral component of requirements generation is the
JWCA process and its interaction with the JROC and ultimately the CJCS and the NCA.
The next chapter will address how the military transforms valid requirements from the
requirements generation process into tangible resources in the resource allocation
process.
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IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS
The United States is embarking on an era where resource allocation decisions
cannot be made with any degree of certainty. Decision-makers no longer know exactly
what to expect. During the Cold War, decision-makers functioned in a bipolar world.
Consequently, information relating to threats to our national security allowed easier
prediction of requirements and therefore the decision-makers could allocate resources
more effectively. The Cold War resource allocation process reflected a national policy to
contain communism at any cost. Today, decision-makers must struggle with conditions
of risk and uncertainty. [Ref. 22, p. 18] Lt. Col. William H. Jackson, USAF, in his
research project The Role Of The CINC In The Defense Resource Allocation Process.
stated: "The defense resource allocation process involves many factors including the
federal budget, weapons system acquisition, joint federal budget, joint planning, and
domestic political issues." [Ref. 22, p. 3] It comes as no surprise that resource allocation
is what the Services do 90% of the time. [Ref. 22, p. 36] If resources are not matched
with rational plans and concepts, national objectives cannot be achieved.
The first step in this process is to identify our national policies and objectives and
the threats associated with those policies and objectives. From these, a national security-
strategy is derived. CDR Keller expanded on this topic by stating: "While the defense
resource allocation process looks primarily at acquiring and maintaining resource needed
for effective execution of the military strategy, the process also supports various elements
of the national political and economic strategies that are closely integrated with the
military strategy." [Ref. 14, pp. 1-2 - 1-3]
»
The resource allocation process is driven by strategic decisions which answer
questions such as how much, what kind, when, etc. These decisions answer many force
planning issues relating to the national interests and objectives of the United States.
However, it is crucial to remember that the resources available to the DoD are finite and
must compete with other requirements within the federal government. In a nutshell, the
Services must compete for very limited resources. Consequently, a continuous battle
wages on whether to fund defense programs or other federal programs. The potential
impact on the DoD is that the force structure needed to address all of our national
interests and objectives will most likely never materialize. Politics is a game of
compromise. Programming is where objectives are reconciled with available resources.
[Ref. 14, p. 1-3] A respectable programming effort must be completed to ensure that the
DoD obtains the maximum amount of resources available. Once programs are approved,
they receive a budget authority to obtain the resources allocated to them in order to
perform their mission(s) in accordance with the developed military strategy. The end
product of the resource allocation process determines what is dedicated to support nation
interests. [Ref. 22, p. 2]
A common misconception is to equate the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) and the resource allocation process. Although the PPBS comprise a
significant portion of the resource allocation process, it is not the process in its entirety.
The PPBS is used to determine the resources necessary to combat the threat. [Ref. 22, p.
32] A clear concise national military strategy assists the DoD in determining the
necessary resources via the PPBS.
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The resource allocation process is actually comprised of four separate systems.
These systems are the:
• Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
• Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
• Federal Budget System (FBS)
• Systems Acquisition Process (SAP) [Ref. 14, pp. 1-3 - 1-4]
Within each system, numerous personnel function to assure the process operates as
designed. Some personnel have critical roles in all four of the systems noted above. Of
particular note, the following personnel, and their associated functions, play extremely
critical roles in the resource allocation process:
The President
The National Security Council (NSC)








Strategy and policy guidance.
Develops fiscal constraints, collating data,
and monitoring budget execution.
Strategy force planning, mission definition,
and program assessment.
Provide input for near-term requirements
and expend budgeted resources.
Build programs and prepare for war.
Oversees the entire resource allocation
process. Critical role in force development
planning guidance, resource issue
resolutions, and reviewing the total resource
allocation program.
Resolves various issues, provides guidance,
and makes recommendations to SECDEF.
Oversees requirements generation process
and mission needs determination.
Figure 4-1 [Ret". 14. pp. 1-4 - 1-5]
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A. THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)
"The JSPS is the formal review of the national security environment and the
national security objectives, threat evaluation, assessment of current strategy and existing
or proposed programs and budgets, military strategies and forces necessary to achieve
national security objectives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)." [Ref. 22, p. 6] There is
no doubt that the JSPS is the primary focus of DoD military planning. [Ref. 14, p. II- 1]
The JSPS functions as the "framework for developing military advice on resource
allocation considerations and converting national security policy into strategic guidance."
[Ref. 22, p. 13] Although the JSPS is a separate process from the PPBS, it is integrated
in and is complementary to the PPBS. It follows a relatively simple process that
identifies the military threat to our national interests, assesses our forces on their ability
to engage the threat, develops a strategy to meet and defeat the threat, allocates existing
forces and resources to the CINCs to carry out the strategy, and provides the required
planning to properly program for future force requirements. The CINCs provide their
inputs via their respective sponsor Service and the Chairman. [Ref. 22, p. 7] The JSPS
provides an avenue for the Chairman to provide input to the Services for their PPBS
activities. [Ref. 22, p. 4] The JSPS produces the following documents:
• The National Military Strategy (NMS)
• The Joint Planning Document (JPD)
• The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)
• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
Figure 4-2 illustrates the JSPS and the associated documents for the system.
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Figure 4-2
[Adapted from Ref. 14, p. II-4]
1. The Joint Strategic Review (JSR)
The JSPS commences its biennial cycle with the Joint Strategic Review (JSR).
The JSR gathers information, addresses issues, and assists with the integration of
strategy, operational planning, and program assessments. [Ref. 14, p. II-2] This review
produces:
• JSR Issue Papers - Addressing changes in the strategic environment.
• JSR Annual Report - Summary of issues studied during the previous year.
Also makes recommendations for changes to the NMS and the Chairman's
Guidance (CG)
• Long Range Vision Paper - Addresses the future environment 20 years from
now.
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CDR Keller summarized the JSR as providing "a process that gathers inputs from the
CINCs, Services, Joint Staff and other appropriate parties and considers trends,
projections, issues, and situations that can affect national security planning. The JSR
process provides the Chairman with information which he may use to provide guidance
regarding the NMS." [Ref. 14, p. II-5]
The CG primarily functions as a framework for developing the National Military
Strategy and for setting priorities in the JPD. [Ref. 14, p. II-5] It may be promulgated at
any time during the JSR process. Additionally, the CG acts as the bridge between the
JSR process and the process utilized to draft the NMS. [Ref. 14, pp. JJ-5 - JJ-6]
The NMS is the document utilized by the Chairman to advise the National
Security Council on a recommended strategy for military forces within the constraints of
the current fiscal environment. These recommendations lead to the desired force
structure necessary to support the national security objectives of the government. The
NMS also:
• Provides the Secretary of Defense with an appraisal of the current defense
policy and any recommended changes to that policy based upon the JSR.
• Provides a current intelligence assessment regarding threats to our national
objectives.
• Recommends the force structure available within the constraints of the current
fiscal environment that still meets our strategic objectives.
• Provides an evaluation of the risks associated with the recommended force
structure relating to the recommended strategy. [Ref. 14, pp. II-6 - II-7]
The Joint Planning Document (JPD) provides detailed information regarding items within
the NMS. The JPD is utilized by the Secretary of Defense in preparing the DPG. The
JPD is comprised of seven volumes:
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Volume 1 - Intelligence
Volume 2 - Nuclear
Volume 3 - C4 Systems
Volume 4 - Future Capabilities
Volume 5 - Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
Volume 6 - Manpower and Personnel
Volume 7 - Logistics [Ref. 14, pp. 11-7 - II-8]
The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) will be discussed in detail in subsequent
chapters however it is important to note the CPA plays a critical role in the resource
allocation process. For clarity purposes in this chapter, the CPA provides the Chairman's
personal assessment to the Secretary of Defense on the adequacy and capabilities of the
DoD as deinfed in the most recent Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) from the
Services and Defense Agencies. [Ref. 14, p. II-8] The CPA comments on the Services'
abilities to execute the NMS and the allocation of resources within the DoD. The CPA is
also recognized as a key input to the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). [Ref. 14, p. II-8]
In summary, the CPA:
• Is submitted biennially to the Secretary of Defense no later than 45 days after
the release of POMs.
• Assesses the overall balance of military forces.
• Assesses POM conformance with CESfC priorities.
• Provides alternative recommendations to the Secretary of Defense within
mandated parameters.
• Recommends changes to POMs for greater conformance to CENCs priorities.
[Ref. 14, p. n-8]
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The Joint Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is a document, classified Top Secret, which
provides guidance to the CINCs and Services on accomplishing tasks within current
military capabilities. The JSCP is derived from various sources that include national
security objectives and policies, intelligence estimates, force structure predictions, and
Secretary of Defense guidance. [Ref. 14, p. II-8]
All in all, the JSCP:
Provides strategy and missions, as well as apportionment of active and reserve
forces, to the CINCs.
Is reviewed and revised on a continual basis. (It is published as required.)
Tasks the CINCs to submit Operations Plans (OPLANs), Contingency Plans
(CONPLANs), and contingency summaries to the Chairman for approval.
Serves as a framework for military advice to the NCA.
Provides intelligence estimates relating to the impact on operational planning
and force apportionment.
Includes 15 annexes providing detailed guidance, capabilities, and taskings.
[Ref. 14, p. n-9]
B. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM
(PPBS)
The reader can find a multitude of source material such as books, theses, articles,
directives, and instructions, relating to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS). As a matter of fact, references 1, 3, and 4 of this thesis directly address
the subject of the PPBS while virtually every reference utilized in this thesis addresses
the PPBS in some manner. The intent of this section is not to completely describe the
PPBS process but rather to indicate the relationship of the PPBS process with the
resource allocation process. CDR Keller observed that:
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Budgeting previously had focused on such things as salaries, overhead,
and capital expenditures rather than on the objectives or results to be
achieved with those resources. PPBS was introduced in DoD so that
resources for national defense could be allocated in a more rational,
systematic way that related more directly to the mission and role of the
department. [Ref. 14, p. III-2]
He further stated: "The purpose of PPBS is to make a proposal that will field forces.
PPBS is nothing more than a rational decision process. PPBS takes national security
objectives and, using available resources ($), produces forces." [Ref. 14, p. III-5] The
primary function of the programming phase of the PPBS is to optimixe defense resource
allocation. The PPBS is the DoD's resource allocation process and that process, like the
PPBS, is cyclical. Figure 4-3 provides a summary of this process. [Ref. 14, p. 1-2]
Defense Resource Allocation Process:
Strategy to Reality
Figure 4-3 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. 1-2]
Always remember that the ultimate objective of the PPBS is to provide the CINCs with
the best forces, equipment, and support possible within fiscal constraints. [Ref. 22. p. 13]
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The PPBS cycle utilizes six basic documents to accomplish its purpose. These
documents are:
• The National Military Strategy (NMS)
• The Joint Planning Document (JPD)
• The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
• The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
• The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM)
• The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
The NMS, JPD and the POM have been discussed previously. For the purposes of this
thesis, the PDM and FYDP will not be analyzed completely but rather only in the context
that they may affect the resource allocation process. The DPG does have an impact on
the resources allocation process and will be discussed.
1. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
The DPG is a document from the Secretary of Defense to the Services and
Agencies providing guidance for the development of their respective POMs for a
specified period. [Ref. 14, p. III-8] It is the primary planning document utilized by the
military departments and serves as a link between the JSPS and the PPBS. [Ref. 22, p. 8]
The DPG is derived from the NMS and the JPD inputs from the CINCs, Services,
Agencies, and the Chairman. The primary purpose of the DPG is to provide guidance on
resource allocation decisions within the DoD. [Ref. 14, p. III-8] The DPG becomes the
link within the PPBS cycle between the Planning phase and the Programming phase.
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C. FEDERAL BUDGET SYSTEM (FBS) AND THE SYSTEMS
ACUQISITION PROCESS (SAP)
The Federal Budget System (FBS) and the Systems Acquisition Process (SAP) are
beyond the scope of this thesis. They will be discussed as required to show the affect
and/or interaction on or with the resource allocation process. Reference 14 provides an
excellent description of both the FBS and SAP. Figure 4-4 illustrates the four phases of
the FBS. [Ref. 14, p. IV-26]
The Four Phases of the
Federal Budget Process
Period before the Fiscal Year
Beyond
Fiscal Year
March Nov Jan Oct Sept 30 Nov 15
Phase 1 - Executive preparations S
submission (beginning 19 months
belore fiscal year.)'




(beginning 9 months before
fiscal year.)2
Phase 3 - Implementation and
control of enacted budget
(during fiscal year.)
Phase 4 - Review
& audit
'The President s budget is transmitted to Congress within 15 days after Congress convenes
?
lt appropriation aclion is not completed by Sepiember 30. Congress enacts temporary appropriation
(i e Continuing Resolution)
Figure 4-4 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. IV-26]
By and large, the SAP follows the policies and procedures in various DoD
regulations and instructions particularly the DoD 5000 series of instructions. Figure 4-5
illustrates the acquisition milestones and phases of the SAP. [Ref. 14, p. V-20]
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Figure 4-5 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. V-20]
CDR Keller expertly summarized the resource allocation process as:
JSPS produces strategy, resource needs and mission tasks; PPBS proposes
a six year plan to field the best mix of forces, given resource constraints;
the acquisition system defines mission needs, and produces and maintains
weapon systems; the federal budget process provides the funds. Without
all of these subsystems interacting, we cannot achieve the objective: forces
in the field and at sea, properly equipped and supported. [Ref. 14, p. VI- 1]
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In summary, the resource allocation process is complex, cyclical, and extremely
interactive. It utilizes input from various sources in the joint warfighting community,
such as the JROC and the JWCA process, to assist the Chairman and the Secretary of
Defense to evaluate and program for the most cost effective military force possible within
current fiscal constraints. The next chapter will discuss how the CPA and the CPR are
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formulated. Special attention will be given to the sources of input to the CPA and CPR
as well as the true nature and intent of these documents.
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V. FORMULATION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM
ASSESSMENT (CPA) AND THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM
RECOMMENDATION (CPR)
So far in this thesis, I have analyzed the requirements generation process, the
resource allocation process, and the role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in these
processes. A reference to the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's
Program Recommendation (CPR) was reflected in these processes. Within these topics,
the interaction of many other processes related to requirements generation and resource
allocation was demonstrated including the role of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC), the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Joint Strategic Planning
System (JSPS), and so on. Each of these processes not only serves a particular purpose
but also builds on the others with the ultimate objective of a defendable DoD portion of
the President's Budget. An integral part of this objective is the ability of the Chairman to
assess programs and budget and recommend alternatives to the Secretary of Defense
through the CPA and CPR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01. The Joint
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process, (Reference 19) is the instruction utilized in
preparing items for inclusion into the CPA and the CPR. This instruction characterizes
the CPA and the CPR as:
...the basis for fulfilling the Chairman's program and budget advisory
responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Designed to offer the
Chairman's personal viewpoint, the CPR and CPA are supported by both
the deliberate planning process and the JWCA process but are produced
and delivered separately from other Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) and Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
documents. [Ref. 19, p. 3]
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The CPA and the CPR are derived from the cyclical and interactive JWCA process
thereby assuring the Chairman has the best information possible to base his assessments
and recommendations.
A. ROLE OF THE JOINT STAFF
Since the CPA and the CPR are products of the JWCA process, it is only natural
to assume that the Joint Staff would be central in the development of the CPA and the
CPR. After all, JWCA sponsors are Joint Staff Directorates. It is critical that the reader
never loses sight of the fact that the CPA and the CPR are considered personal
correspondence from the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense and, as such, they are
closely held documents. These documents highlight the Chairman's position on
programmatic and budgetary issues to the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 14, p. III.5-6] If
the reader should ignore this point, then the CPA and the CPR appear to be just better
staffed Joint Staff documents up and down the chain of command.
The Directorate for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8) is the
primary directorate responsible for the development of the CPA and the CPR. They work
closely with the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) in the formulation of
these documents. J-8 is the focal point in the Joint Staff for PPBS issues. They provide
recommendations on force structure, develop trade-off analysis on resource levels,
produce military net assessments, and develop resource-constrained force structures.
Additionally, they are responsible for program and budget assessments and reviews and
function as the point of contact for the CINCs, Services, and OSD for resource allocation
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and budget issues within the PPBS. [Ref. 23, p. 25] Various divisions within the J-8
organization exist to accomplish this task. With respect to the formulation of the CPA
and the CPR, this function falls under the direction of the Joint Requirements Division
(JRD). The JRD as a whole is comprised of three functional areas:
• CINC Liaison
• JROC Secretariat
• Plans and Integration
Specifically, the Plans and Integration branch addresses all JROC and JROC Review
Board (JRB) issues as well as providing the Chairman a draft CPA and CPR. [Ref. 26]
The J-8 is the link in the integration process for the Joint Staff. The criticality of the role
of the Joint Staff cannot be overstated. Although the Chairman cannot unilaterally
modify Service POMs to meet his expectations or joint warfighting requirements, he can
utilize his position as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend such changes to
the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 22, p. 36]
B. FORMULATION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM
ASSESSMENT (CPA)
The CPA transmits the Chairman's programmatic concerns and recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense as required by Title 10 U.S. Code. In CJCSI 3137.01, the
CPA is described thusly:
The CPA contains the Chairman's alternative program recommendations
and budget proposals for the Secretary of Defense's consideration in
refining the defense program and budget. These adjustments are intended
to enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and more
adequately reflect strategic and CINC priorities. [Ref. 19. p. D-4]
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As previously stated, it is submitted as personal correspondence from the Chairman to the
Secretary of Defense as input to the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). [Ref. 19,
p. B-5] The delivery of the CPA occurs near the end of the Summer Program Review
cycle around the early to mid-September timeframe. In a nutshell, the CPA describes
how the Chairman perceived how well the DoD did with respect to the programmatic
guidance found in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). [Ref. 26]
Inputs to the CPA are compiled from a variety of sources such as the Joint
Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), various CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs),
CINC issue papers, etc. [Ref. 27] Topics become CPA issues from a dual stream
approach of Service and Agency POM evaluation. On one side, the JWCA teams assess
the POMs for DPG compliance while simultaneously the CINCs are assessing the same
POMs. JWCA results are reported to the JROC while CINC results are reported directly


















CPA issues cover a wide range of topics. Some even seem to be out of the "warfighting"
role of the DoD but they do affect the overall effectiveness of the armed forces and, as
such, warrant Chairman and Secretary of Defense attention. Several topics included in
CPA 97 were:
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Integration
Ultra High Frequency Demand Access Multiple Assigned (UHF DAMA)
Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
Anti-Personnel Landmine
Theater Air & Missile Defense (TAMD)
Enroute Fuels
Global Air Traffic Management (GATM)
Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ)/Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)
Compensation
[Ref. 21, p. 23]
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In this section, the structure of the CPA is described.
1. CPA Structure
The structure, or layout, of the CPA makes it a relatively easy document to read
and understand. A review of a previous CPA revealed that the document is subdivided
into 4 distinct topics.
• Introduction
• Standard Topic of Discussion
"' QDR Integration focuses on the implementation of recommendations and directives resulting from the
QDR. UHF DAMA allows numerous users to simultaneously utilize the same UHF satellite channel for
communications traffic. GCCS is a global network of satellite and landline communications apparatus
enabling the warfighters to communicate with each other anywhere in the world. The antipersonnel
landmine issue is a high priority in many nations around the world. The current initiative is to eliminate all
antipersonnel landmines. The United States, to date, has rejected this initiative. TAMD utilizes a m>nad
of antiair systems to successfully defeat air threats on the battlefield. The subject of enroute fuels in an
ongoing concern for joint warfighters. This topic addresses potential problems of fueling in foreign
countries under various conditions of alert. GATM is an over-arching approach to aerial navigation of the
future utilizing such systems as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and Precision Landing System




• Summary of Recommendations
a. Introduction
The Chairman opens the introduction with general remarks relating to the
CPA. A statement is then made indicating the CPA was conducted in accordance with
Section 153, Chapter 5 of Title 10 U.S. Code. This statement reaffirms the statutory duty
of the Chairman to conduct this assessment and report his finding to the Secretary of
Defense. The Chairman states in this section that he has reviewed the POMs of the
Services and Agencies and recommends program adjustments in order to enhance joint
readiness and to better satisfy joint warfighting capability requirements. He also provides
comments on how the JROC, JWCA, and the CENCs contribute to the development of the
CPA. In other words, his assessments and recommendations were not made in a vacuum
but rather from an extensive and exhaustive series of evaluations, discussions, and
briefings.
b. Standard Topic of Discussion
Due to the nature of some topics, the CPA is a classified document and, as
such, discussions and comments of exact topics will not be made in this thesis. Rather, a
generic topic of Information Security will be utilized as an example of a CPA topic. This
section of the CPA is relatively straightforward. The topic is identified, e.g. Information
Security, and a short narrative description of the issue(s) relating to the topic is made.
c. Subtopic
This item is self-explanatory. If there are additional issues requiring the
attention of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense relating to the topic, they are
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listed here. For example, issues relating to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR) would be considered a subtopic of Information Security. Additionally, the subtopic
area is where the Chairman would make any recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense relating to the topic.
d. Summary of Recommendations
The Chairman summarizes his recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense by outlining his fiscal recommendations in tabular form for ease of reading and
analysis. The tabular form utilized contains fiscal recommendations for POM
adjustments in three primary areas:
1
.
Shifting of Funds Recommendations
2. Plus-Up Recommendations
3. Potential Savings Recommendations
Keep in mind that the CPA is an assessment of how well the POMs of the Services and
Agencies conformed to the DPG and, as such, becomes a critical input to the Secretary of
Defense's PDM.
C. FORMULATION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM
RECOMMENDATION (CPR)
While the CPA looks back and assesses conformance with the DPG, the CPR is a
look ahead with recommendations for the future. The CPR is delivered early in the POM
cycle thereby providing programming and budgeting inputs prior to the completion of the
DPG. It contains the Chairman's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense relating
to future programs deemed important in the creation or enhancement of joint warfighting
y>
capabilities. [Ref. 1 1, p. 5-20] CPR development considers the initial input provided by
the Joint Planning Document (JPD). This input may expand, refine, or modify JPD
programming priorities. [Ref. 25, p. D-6] The CPR is primarily comprised of
recommendations from the JROC to the Chairman for consideration and ultimately
inclusion into the DPG. However, it is true that once the CPR goes to the Chairman, it is
anyone's guess on what will be included in the final document. Again, since the CPR is
considered as personal correspondence from the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense,
the best indication as to the recommendations in the CPR is what is published in the
DPG. Several of the topics in CPR '98 include:
Anti-Personnel Landmines
Force Readiness





Theater Air & Missile Defense Strategy
Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism
Information Assurance
[Ref. 21, p. 24]
Some of the items mirror items in the CPA but some also recommend a long-range look
at joint warfighting issue for the DoD.
In this section, the structure of the CPR is described.
1. CPR Structure
The structure of the CPR is strikingly similar to that of the CPA. Again, this
structure makes it a relatively easy document to read and understand. A review of a
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previous CPR revealed that the document is virtually a copy of the CPA with respect to
the 4 distinct topics addressed.
• Introduction
• Standard Topic of Discussion
• • Subtopic
• Summary of Recommendations
a. Introduction
Much like the CPA, the Chairman opens the introduction with general
remarks relating to the CPR. A statement is then made indicating the CPA was
conducted in accordance with Section 1 13, Chapter 2 and Section 153, Chapter 5 of Title
10 U.S. Code. Again, this point reaffirms the statutory duty of the Chairman to evaluate
the joint warfighting capability of the DoD and report his findings and recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman states in this section that the CPR provides
program recommendations for the development of the DPG. He also provides comments
on how the JROC, JWCA, and the CINCs contribute to the development of the CPR.
Once again, it is crucial to note that his recommendations are not made in a vacuum but
rather from an extensive and exhaustive series of evaluations, discussions, and briefings.
b. Standard Topic of Discussion
Like the CPA, the nature of some topics makes it a classified document
and, as such, discussions and comments of exact topics will not be made in this thesis.
Again, I will use a generic topic called Information Security as an example of a CPR
topic. This section of the CPR is relatively brief. The topic is identified, e.g. Information
Security, and a short narrative description of the issue(s) relating to the topic is made.
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c. Subtopic
This item is self-explanatory. If there are additional issues requiring the
attention of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense relating to the topic, they are
listed here. For example, issues relating to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(ISR) would be considered a subtopic of Information Security.
d. Summary of Recommendations
The Chairman summarizes his programmatic recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense. Appendix A of the CPR provides specific programmatic
recommendations in a similar format to that seen in the CPA. It is important to
remember the CPR does not address fiscal issues relating to the proposed programs. That
is the function of the CPA.
Finalization of the CPR runs concurrently with the drafting of the DPG.
Many of the same issues appear in the CPR and the DPG. The CPR provides the
recommendations but the DPG lists the priorities of the programs. [Ref. 27]
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The CPA is best summarized from a passage in the Armed Forces Staff College
(AFSC) Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, (Reference 11):
The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the CJCS's assessment of
the composite POM. It summarizes the views of the CJCS on the balance
and capabilities of the POM force and support level required to attain U.S.
national security objectives. [Ref. 1 1, p. 5-13]
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The CPA is the vehicle utilized by the Chairman to fulfill his statutory duty under Title
10 U.S. Code. These duties include advising the Secretary of Defense on issues relating
to program recommendations and budget proposals of the DoD Services and Agencies.
These issues relate to how well the Services and Agencies conform to the priorities
established in strategic plans and support the priorities established by the CENCs. The
Chairman is also required to submit alternative program recommendations and budget
proposals, as required, to the Secretary of Defense. These alternatives must remain
within projected resource levels and guidance as provided by the Secretary of Defense.
The CPA development process begins well before the Services and Agency POMs are
published and ends when critical joint warfighting issues are identified for inclusion in
the CPA. Services, CENCs, Agencies, and the Joint Staff are intimately involved
throughout the entire development process. This coordination is critical to properly
identify and develop specific issues appropriate for the Chairman to formally raise to the
Secretary of Defense. Documents considered in CPA development include POM
preparation instructions, OSD Fiscal Guidance, the DPG, the POMs themselves, the
NMS, the JPD, the JWCA, the JMRR, the JMNA, the CINC's IPLs, the Combat Support
Agency Responsiveness and Readiness Report, etc. [Ref. 1 1, pp. 5-13 - 5-14]
Likewise, the CPR can be summarized as:
• Being delivered early in the POM cycle
• Providing input in the programming and budgeting process prior to
completion of the DPG.
• Articulating issues deemed critical for the Secretary of Defense to consider
when identifying priorities and performance goals in the DPG. [Ref. 19. p. 3]
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The Secretary of Defense considers these recommendations when finalizing the DPG.
The DPG then identifies the relative priorities among established and emerging
capabilities and provides measurable performance goals for attaining them. CPR
recommendations are not restricted to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and are
therefore not fiscally constrained. The CPR focuses on specific recommendations that
enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and joint training, and better satisfy
overall joint warfighting requirements. [Ref. 19, p. 3]
In conclusion, the CPA and the CPR have a magnifying affect on the "purple
lens" on the PPBS. [Ref. 14, p. III.5-7] This is evident from the fact that the JWCA
assessment process and the PPBS cycle are connected via the CPA and the CPR. These
documents provide the Chairman's personal input to the Secretary of Defense's PDG and
PDM respectively. [Ref. 19, p. C-l]
The CPA and the CPR have a profound impact on the Secretary of Defense's
decisions relating to the DoD, and ultimately, the President's Budget. The potential
downstream affects on the Service and Agency POMs are enormous. Attention to the
formulation process of the CPA and the CPR cannot be taken lightly nor should it be
overlooked. The next chapter will provide a summary of this thesis as well as additional
issues to pursue as follow-on subject requiring further research on this topic.
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VI. SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Regardless of the environment, (operational, political, fiscal, etc.) changing times
require an adaptive military. It should come as no surprise that we cannot support a
wartime force structure during periods of relative peace. However, we must be vigilant
in order to protect our national interests and objectives. Consequently if the military
adaptation to its environment is not properly planned and managed, the results could be
disastrous.
History shows us example after example of the results of improper planning. Post
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam are classic examples of "slash and burn" tactics
utilized to downsize the military. These tactics resulted in a hollow force. Today, the
term "peace dividend" signals the approach of another hollow force.
Despite the tact that Congress has not learned a lesson from these experiences, the
military, in an effort to become more effective at warfighting, has become increasingly
better at combined arms since World War II. This effort commenced with the National
Security Act of 1947. This act, as amended, designated the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, as the principal advisor to the President on military matters. Regarding the
Chairman, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal recommended:
.
.
.that the Congress provide for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to take
precedence over all other military personnel, and to be the principal
military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and to
perform such other duties as they may prescribe. [Ref. 3. p. 80]
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Although a good first step, the National Security Act of 1947 did not cure all of the
problems within the DoD. As the Cold War escalated, and the political and fiscal
environments in the United States changed, further reform of the DoD was required.
These actions culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Among other things,
this Act significantly increases the power and influence of the Chairman. He is now a
major player in the requirements generation and resource allocation processes of the
DoD. Although the Chairman does not have the influence nor the authority to adjust
Service and Agency Program Objectives Memorandums (POMs), he does have enormous
influence on these POMs through the Secretary of Defense. The influence of the
Chairman is demonstrated in two documents known as the Chairman's Program
Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).
Military requirements for force structure and resources are developed through an
exhaustive process known as the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA).
The JWCAs are "continuous assessments conducted by teams of warfighting and
functional area experts from the Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies, and others as required." [Ref. 19, p. 4] Granted,
other processes influencing requirements generation and resource allocation are occurring
at the same time but the JWCA is the focal point for programmatic issues in the DoD.
This process is directed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), a critical
element of DoD reform noted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The JROC is where the
Services have the ability to shape the capabilities of the joint warfighting environment
and ultimately the shape of the overall DoD budget.
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The two primary products of the JWCA cycle are the CPA and the CPR. The
CPR is produced in the March timeframe and has a significant impact on the composition
of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The CPA is produced in the September
timeframe and has a corresponding impact on the Program Decision Memorandum
(PDM). Figure 3-10 provides an excellent illustration of the JWCA process. The
requirements generation process is cyclical and continuous just like the JWCA.
The resource allocation process in the DoD includes input from a variety of
sources such as the federal budget, weapons system acquisition programs, joint planning
and domestic political issues. [Ref. 22, p. 3] These inputs are manifested in such
systems as:
• The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
• The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
• The Federal Budget System (FBS)
• The Systems Acquisition Process (SAP) [Ref. 14, p. II-8]
Much like the JWCA and requirements generation, a methodical process of debate and
evaluation determines resource allocation. This process commences with the
identification of national policies, objectives and threats and concludes with the budget
authority to procure the required resource to address these items. The defense resource
allocation process is illustrated in Figure 4-2. Since resource allocation is politically
sensitive (pork barrel projects), it is subject to compromise within the Congress and is not
necessarily congruent with military necessity. Consequently the CPA, in particular, is a
critical document in the resource allocation process. The CPA comments on the ability
(w
of the DoD to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS) and overall resource
allocation within the DoD.
As previously stated, the CPA and CPR are the primary products of the JWCA
cycle. The CINCs, Services, and Agencies have a direct input in the development of the
CPA and CPR via the JWCA process. The Joint Staff, J-8 Joint Requirements Division
(JRD) coordinate inputs from the CINCs, Services, and Agencies in the preparation of the
CPA and CPR for the Chairman. Although similar in design and format, the CPA and
CPR are different in function and purpose. The common format is:
• Introduction
• Standard Topic of Discussion
• Subtopic
• Summary of Recommendations
The CPA assesses Service and Agency POMs with respect to fulfilling joint warfighting
requirements as reflected in the DPG. It tells how well the Services and Agencies did in
their POMs. The CPR provides recommendations for future joint warfighting
requirements that Service and Agencies should consider in future POMs. It takes a look
ahead. Both documents are considered personal correspondence between the Chairman
and the Secretary of Defense and, as such, are closely held documents.
B. OBSERVATIONS
The Goldwater-Nichols Act brought about much needed changes in the DoD.
Although developed during the Cold War, it provided an excellent framework to address
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the current issues of downsizing and realignment of resources to support national
interests. The increased power of the Chairman allows a "white knight" into the
requirements generation and resource allocation processes. There is now a credible-
military voice for the DoD in the Congress and the Executive.
Enormous amounts of time and effort by senior military personnel go in to the
development of the CPA and the CPR. Pertinent issues are evaluated and debated in the:
• Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) (One Star Level)
• JROC Review Boards (JRBs) (Two Star Level)
• Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) (Four Star Level)
One aspect of the current process that appears to have the potential to jeopardize
the system is the "veil of secrecy" associated with the CPA and the CPR. If the issues are
identified, evaluated, and debated in such senior military groups, then why is it necessary
for a "veil of secrecy" surrounding the final CPA and CPR documents? The CINCs,
Services, and Agencies provide fully staffed input and ultimately the approved drafts of
the documents to the Chairman. These documents have a potential to severely impact on
Service and Agency POMs. In order to maintain technological proficiency. Service
priorities may require expenditures above and beyond fulfillment of DPG requirements.
Consider this scenario. Albeit unlikely, it illustrates a potential problem of the
current environment surrounding the CPA and the CPR. The U.S. Navy currently
possesses 12 aircraft carriers. Each carrier is considered a national asset and therefore
subject to the primary direction of the National Command Authority (NCA). One of
these carriers, the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, is additionallv designated as the Navy's
reserve training carrier. When not deployed, this carrier is dedicated to the training of
W
naval reservists for readiness qualifications. Considering the current drawdown of active
forces, more emphasis on selected reservists (SELRES) involvement in worldwide
contingency operations is required. As this requirement for SELRES personnel in
contingency operations increases, the SELRES community cannot maintain currently
with a fully deployed carrier such as the KENNEDY. Consequently, an additional carrier
is required allowing for a permanent carrier dedicated solely to maintaining the
proficiency of the SELRES community for contingency operations. This requirement is
deemed by the Navy to be a priority for the long-term stability of carrier battle group air
assets and effective SELRES integration into naval aviation forces. It is assumed that the
JROC has already approved this initiative based upon CENC desires to have a reserve
force ready to respond on short notice that is fully capable of meeting the desired mission
requirements. The Chairman, not agreeing with the recommendation from the JROC,
unilaterally rejects the Navy's proposal via the CPA and/or the CPR. Since these
documents are closely held, the Navy must deduce the Chairman's recommendation
either from back-channel sources in the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff or from the
DPG/PDM when published.
Consideration should be made to life the veil and allow the corporate Joint Chiefs
to formally rebut, to the Secretary of Defense, the appraisals and recommendations of the
Chairman. There is no statutory requirement for this secrecy. The Chairman can
continue to fulfill his statutory Title 10 U.S. Code requirements and let the Secretary of
Defense decide any contentious issues. Under the current system, the Chairman has an
audience with the Secretary of Defense that could alter the Service and Agency POMs
significantly. It is conceded that the chances of this scenario occurring are small. The
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professionalism of the officers in the DoD, in concert with the exhaustive staffing process
of all proposals, will minimize the change of this scenario of ever occurring however, it
still remains a possibility.
The CPA and the CPR, as currently derived and implemented, are excellent tools
for minor programmatic adjustments and refocusing resource allocation efforts within the
DoD. Regardless of how these documents are derived, implemented, or the potential
impact they may have on Service and Agency POMs, all officers involved in
programmatic issues should have an appreciation for the CPA and the CPR. These
documents are relatively new in the DoD. Keep in mind, the first CPA was published in
October 1994. [Ref. 1, p. 63] The number of officers knowledgeable in the process and
content of the documents remains few. In the coming years, more and more officers will
be assigned to the Joint Requirements Division (JRD) of J-8 and will gain an appreciation
for the CPA and the CPR. Most of these officer will have prior Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS) experience.
1. Recommendations
As these officers become familiar with the process, an examination of the effects
of the CPA and the CPR on the Service and Agency POMs can be analyzed. Also, a
review of recent program changes relating to the CPA and CPR action may be studied.
Finally, the effect on the CINC Major Force Programs (MFPs) may also be investigated.
Regardless, the CPA and the CPR are documents that are here to stay. It is incumbent





Categories of Acquisition Programs and Milestone Decision Authorities
Acquisition programs are categorized as:
1. Acquisition Category (ACAT) I Major Defense Acquisition Program
(MDAP)
2. ACAT IA Major Automated Information System (MAIS)
3. ACAT II (major systems)
4. ACAT III (all other acquisition programs)
A complete description of each ACAT follows.
ACAT I
ACAT I programs are MDAPs. An MDAP is defined as a program estimated by
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD (A&T)) to require
eventual expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more then S355
million (FY 1996 constant dollars) or procurement of more than $2,135 billion (FY 1996
constant dollars), or those designated by the USD (A&T) to be ACAT I
ACAT I programs have two sub-categories:
1
.
ACAT ID [MDA is USD (A&T)] The "D" refers to the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB), which advises the USD (A&T) at major
decision points.
2. ACAT IC [MDA is the DoD Component Head or, if delegated, the DoD
Component Acquisition Executive (CAE)]. The "C" refers to Component
The USD (A&T) designates programs as ACAT ID or ACAT IC.
ACATIA
ACAT IA programs are MAJSs. A MAIS is estimated by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)) to
require program costs for any single year in excess of $30 million (FY 1996 constant
dollars), total program in excess of $120 million (FY 1996 constant dollars), or total life-
cycle costs in excess of $360 million (FY 1996 constant dollars), or those designated by
the ASD (C3I) to be ACAT IA
ACAT IA programs have two sub-categories:
1. ACAT JAM [MDA is the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Chief
Information Officer (CIO) (formerly the Senior IM Official, the
ASD(C3I)]. The "M" refers to Major Automated Information Systems
Review Council (MAISRC).
2. ACAT IAC [MDA is the Department of Defense (DoD) Component
Chief Information Officer (CIO) (formerly the Senior IM Official)]. The
"C" refers to Component.
The ASD (C3I) designates programs as ACAT IAM or ACAT IAC
The DoD Component is responsible for notifying the USD (A&T) or ASD (C3I) when
cost growth or a change in acquisition strategy results in reclassifying a formerly lower
ACAT program as an ACAT I OR IA program
ACAT II
ACAT II programs are defined as those acquisition programs that do not meet the
criteria for an ACAT I program, but do meet the criteria for a major system. A major
system is defined as a program estimated by the DoD Component Head to require
eventual expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $75M
in fiscal year (FY) 1980 constant dollars (approximately S140M in FY 1996 constant
dollars), or for procurement of more than S300M in FY 1980 constant dollars
(approximately S645M in FY 1996 constant dollars), or those designated by the DoD
Component Head to be ACAT II. The MDA is the DoD CAE.
ACATm
ACAT III programs are defined as those acquisition programs that do not meet
the criteria for an ACAT I, an ACAT IA, or an ACAT II The MDA is designated by the
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